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I. INTRODUCTION
A great number of leases are executed for commercial purposes.
Equipment, edifices, land, rights and labor are commonly objects of
modem commercial leases. Due to the economic importance of leases,
parties to a commercial lease often employ exacting and specific terms
in the lease for protection of their business and economic welfare.'
Such was the case in McCrary v. Park South Properties.2 The lessor
in McCrary challenged the continuing validity of the lease and sought
cancellation. The court, finding for the defendant-lessees, held that the
lessors had no right to cancellation of the lease. It suspended the lease
for the duration of the litigation so that, in effect, the lease term was
extended for approximately nine years beyond the date when the lease
would have terminated by its own accord. The purpose of this note is
to analyze the basis for and pragmatism of the suspension and extension
of a commercial lease as a remedy for the lessee when the lessor's claim
for cancellation is denied. An analysis of this remedy in the context of
commercial leases is significant because the commercial lease is an often-
utilized business method, the remedy utilized in McCrary is relatively
uncommon, and there has been no significant revision of the lease
articles3 since their original codification. In an effort to examine the
outcome in this case, this note, after giving a summary of the specific
facts of the McCrary case, evaluates past Louisiana jurisprudence, dis-
cusses the dearth of similar remedies in Louisiana surface4 lease cases,
and looks at common law jurisdictions' treatment of the issue. The
Copyright 1991, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIw.
1. See, e.g., Saucier v. John-Clai Co., 408 So. 2d 27 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981);
Convert-A-Bed, Inc. v. Salem, 360 So. 2d 605 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978); Taylor Lumber
Co., Inc. v. Fuller, 292 So. 2d 878 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 294 So. 2d 839
(1974).
2. 560 So. 2d 38 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 563 So. 2d 1156 (1990).
3. La. Civ. Code arts. 2688-2776.
4. "Surface" leases are meant to contrast with "mineral" leases in the context of
this note. However, this is not intended to limit the application of this discussion to
leases of immovable property alone; rather, it is intended to cover all leases outside the
mineral lease context.
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Louisiana Civil Code articles relating to the issues in McCrary also will
be examined. Next, French doctrine interpreting comparable articles in
the Code Napoleon is scrutinized and the development of French law
in this area is traced. Finally, analysis and recommendation is offered
for the treatment of disputes involving commercial leases. In that anal-
ysis, this note questions the use of equity in a commercial situation and
offers to courts a prudent and fair method of relief and standards of
judgment based on present code provisions relating to damages.
II. THE SITUATION IN McCrary
The lease executed in McCrary called for a term of fifty years and
covered a thirty-one and one-half acre tract of undeveloped urban prop-
erty.' It was the defendants' intent as lessees to develop the acreage
into a shopping mall.6 The defendants were aware prior to entering the
lease of the recent completion of what would be a competing shopping
mall development? Nevertheless, the lease was confected including terms
that "the property be developed as a regional commercial center. ' 8 The
lessors stood to receive, in addition to base rentals, a premium rental
based on the future prosperity of the development. The lessors' intent
was to cause their asset, consisting of unimproved land, to become a
long-term revenue generator.
Lessees, obviously contemplating the improvidence and limited feas-
ibility of financing a mall development while there was competition
already in place, chose to develop "out-parcel tracts on the property
and to delay developing the remainder of the tract until the adjacent
mall had ... become fully leased." 9 As a result of this decision, the
lessees decided to sublet two portions of the ground: one for use as a
branch bank, another for use as an automotive service facility.' 0
The lessors perceived these subleases and the lack of other com-
mercial development to be outside of the contractual intention and
therefore a failure to develop the property in accordance with the terms
of the lease. As a result, the lessors placed the lessees in default by
certified letter and later brought suit for cancellation of the lease due
to the defendants' alleged breach of the development provision."
The trial court found that the lessees, not the lessors, had the
discretion, according to the lease, of when and how to develop the
5. 560 So. 2d at 41.
6. Id.
7. Id.






property. 2 The trial court believed that two "highly skilled represen-
tatives who were well versed in the nuances of the commercial real
estate market" would have provided more specific terms for development
had that been their intention.'3 Plaintiff-lessors were denied cancellation.
More important, because the defendant-lessees had maintained that the
plaintiffs' default letter "constituted a legal obstacle which had wrong-
fully prevented [the lessees] from commercially developing the property,"
the trial court ruled that defendants "were entitled to have the initial
term of the original ground lease suspended and extended by a period
of time equal to and commensurate with the period beginning ... when
the plaintiffs slandered defendants' title . . . and ending when this pro-
ceeding was finally adjudicated.' '4 Further, the court allowed the de-
fendants to retain all rents that came due during the suspension, even
though the defendants had collected rents from their sublessees.
The plaintiff-lessors argued on appeal that the default notice was
not a cloud on defendants' title and that the defendants were not entitled
to a suspension and extension of the lease term.' 5 The plaintiff-lessors
maintained that "defendants were unjustly enriched by the suspension
of the lease since [the defendants] were allowed to collect significant
rents from subtenants while paying no base rent to plaintiffs .... 6
The court of appeal rejected this argument, holding that the suspension
and extension of the lease term was "an effort to fashion an equitable
remedy which would place the parties as nearly as possible in the position
they occupied prior to the interruption of defendants' peaceable pos-
session" and, because the term of the lease was extended, the defendants
would be obligated to pay rentals beyond the original term, thereby
eliminating, in the court's interpretation, any unjust enrichment."
The court's ruling, in effect, extended the term of the lease for a
period of approximately nine years. The appellate court characterized
this as an "equitable" remedy. The court cited no authority for the
action taken and did not distinguish whether this arose from a common
law notion of equity or from "6quit6" as provided for in the Louisiana
Civil Code."
12. Id. at 43.
13. Id. The language quoted here from the appellate opinion demonstrates that the
court believed the trial court's assessment that both parties were of equal bargaining
power and, consequentially, that equitable considerations of "estoppel" or "unconscion-
ability" are not at issue between these sophisticated parties.
14. Id. at 43-44 (emphasis added).
15. Id. at 49.
16. Id. at 50.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code arts. 4, 2053, 2055. See also infra text accompanying
notes 76-88.
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The court in McCrary granted relief on the theory that the lessor
had interrupted the peaceable possession of the lessee. 19 The use of such
a remedy to suspend and extend the term of a lease when a lessor
challenges the continued validity of a lease has its origins in the juris-
prudence of Louisiana concerning mineral leases. 20 The remedy of lease
suspension was jurisprudentially devised to address the peculiarities of
mineral exploration and the common requirements set out in the pro-
visions included within mineral leases. Mineral leases commonly require
the lessee to begin efforts to develop the land for mineral production
within a certain time or, in the alternative, to pay delay rentals. These
leases, either expressly or impliedly, give the lessor a right to cancel the
lease for failure to develop or pay rentals within that term. Because a
mineral lessee would not explore for minerals if the validity of his lease
was questionable (due to the cost-risk factors involved in mineral ex-
ploration), courts have fashioned a remedy for lessees who prevail under
the lessor's challenge for cancellation by ordering an extension of time
added to the lease term in which the lessee could begin development. 21
As one court expressed it:
By filing and prosecuting these suits, plaintiffs have made it
utterly impracticable for the assignees of the lessee to exercise
the rights granted by the leases. Having made it thus imprac-
ticable by their own acts, plaintiffs are not in position to contend
that the leases have expired. The period of litigation should not
be included in determining when the leases expire. 22
This has become accepted jurisprudence in the mineral law of the state,
but it was not made part of the Mineral Code upon its adoption in
1974.23 The mineral law jurisprudence, however, has considered this
19. 560 So. 2d at 50.
20. See, e.g., Baker v. Potter, 223 La. 274, 65 So. 2d 598 (La. 1953); Knight v.
Blackwell Oil & Gas Co., 197 La. 237, 1 So. 2d 89 (La. 1941); Fomby v. Columbia
County Dev. Co., 155 La. 705, 99 So. 537 (La. 1924); Standard Oil Co. v. Webb, 149
La. 245, 88 So. 808 (La. 1921); Gulf Refining Co. v. Hayne, 148 La. 340, 86 So. 891
(La. 1920).
21. See the cases cited in supra note 20.
22. 155 La. at 719, 99 So. at 542.
23. La. Acts 1974, No. 50 enacted La. R.S. 31:1-:214 as the Louisiana Mineral Code.
See especially, La. R.S. 31:119-:121 (1989) (obligations of the lessor-the lessor is bound




remedy a granting of specific performance, not a resort to equity.24
Several factors distinguish surface leases from mineral leases and
thus make application of mineral law jurisprudence inappropriate. The
sub-letting of retail commercial space does not involve equivalent cost-
risk factors. There are no dry holes to account for in such an instance.
Were a lessee of a surface lease to construct buildings or make other
improvements for the purpose of sub-letting only to have his 'lease
subsequently canceled, the law would provide a remedy to the lessee
for the value of his improvements. 2 In contrast, if the mineral lessee
begins drilling the value of exploration is speculative. Thus, the im-
pairment of the surface lessee's ability to continue commercial operations
is not as grave as a mineral lessee's. Further, most of the mineral lease
cases granting this relief involved leases that had expired by the time
the litigation ended. 26 The primary term of the lease in McCrary was
not to expire until the year 2024. Defendant-lessees had ample time to
continue development. The mineral law of this state was developed from
the general law relating to leases, property, and obligations. However,
it was developed for the specific purpose of regulating a complex, capital
intensive industry and should be confined to that application.
The court in McCrary did not, however, allude to these cases. In
fact, the court cited no authority whatsoever for its decision. Regardless,
the rights of lease parties in surface leases should not be determined
by rules developed for the mineral lease area. Additionally, there exists
a body of mineral law jurisprudence which can serve to give notice to
the parties of the consequences of a putting in default in mineral leases.
In contrast, in a surface lease situation, the lessor has not, until McCrary,
had reason to contemplate this risk.
2. Surface Leases
Outside of the mineral lease context, Louisiana courts occasionally
have fashioned similar remedies in suits involving surface leases, but
24. 148 La. at 346, 86 So. at 893 ("[T]he only reason why a breach of any contract
gives rise ordinarily only to an action in damages is that ordinarily specific performance
cannot be enforced. However, performance being the more complete remedy, there can
be no reason why it should not be allowed in cases where it is available and is demanded.").
Compare infra text accompanying notes 94-95. Additionally, the use of this relief in
mineral leases has had some unusual effects on the rights of third parties acquired under
the public records doctrine. See Standard Oil Co. v. Webb, 149 La. 245, 255-64, 88 So.
808, 811-15 (Dawkins, J., dissenting) (A later vendor of the original lessor loses his right
to execute a valid lease, having relied on the public records that the lease was expired,
because the original lessor disturbed the possession of the lessee subsequent to the sale
of the property.).
25. See La. Civ. Code art. 496.
26. The typical mineral lease in Louisiana has a primary term of five years. La. R.S.
31:115 (1989) limits the continuance of a mineral lease without mining, drilling operations
or production occurring to an effective term of ten years at most.
19911
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these cases are very infrequent and dated. 7 Notably, the only such
instances found where courts have "suspended" or "extended" a non-
mineral lease were two cases that arose in the commercial context.
In Davis v. McConnell" the court extended the term of a one-
month equipment lease by fourteen days when the equipment turned
out to be defective and unusable for the purpose intended. 29 The court
relied upon Louisiana Civil Code article 269530 and its requirement that
the landlord "maintain the thing in a condition such as to serve for
the use for which it is hired."'" Davis, however, did not involve the
landlord's interference with the lessee's "peaceable possession" as did
McCrary.
The most notable instance, since it involved commercial real estate,
0
using the kind of action taken in McCrary concerned the lease of
immovable property intended for use as a gas station. In William v.
James,32 the plaintiff had contracted to lease the premises from the
defendant, but the defendant refused to deliver possession, claiming that
the description of the property in the lease was insufficient.33 The su-
preme court, having found that the description errors were reasonable
and reconcilable, addressed the plaintiff's request for extension of the
primary lease term so as to begin his five year term when he would be
put into possession. 4 The court perceived "no reason why the lessor
should be allowed to deprive the lessee of a part of the term of his
lease by withholding possession of the leased premises without just
cause."35 Notably, in Williams, the lessor had not delivered possession
27. It should be noted that the cases found where the courts have previously granted
relief by suspending a lease term may not be exhaustive. The cases noted in this section
represent all the cases found in this author's research. While more instances may exist,
this research revealed only two instances where, outside of the mineral lease context, the
court fashioned a remedy in this manner for a lessee.
28. 146 So. 54 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1933).
29. Id. at 58.
30. La. Civ. Code art. 2695 reads:
The lessor guarantees the lessee against all the vices and defects of the
thing, which may prevent its being used even in case it should appear
he knew nothing of the existence of such vices and defects, at the time
the lease was made, and even if they have arisen since, provided they
do not arise from the fault of the lessee; and if any loss should result
to the lessee from the vices and defects, the lessor shall be bound to
indemnify him for the same.
31. La. Civ. Code art. 2692(2). The full text of article 2692 is quoted in infra note
52.
32. 188 La. 884, 178 So. 384 (La. 1938).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 891, 178 So at 386.
35. Id. (emphasis added). See infra text accompanying notes 98-99.
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at all,3 6 and his motivations were obviously suspect to the court. Further,
this case has historically been considered in the mineral law context and
not applied to surface leases.37
The McCrary court did not reveal any motives or reasons other
than "equity" behind its choice of remedies. Williams and Davis rep-
resent the extent of non-mineral cases where courts had previously utilized
extension or suspension as a remedy for an aggrieved party to a lease,
an action not taken since the 1930's when Williams and Davis were
decided. As will be shown below, these cases are exceptional among
those concerning remedies for a lessor's interference with the lessee's
possession.
3. Traditional Remedies in Surface Leases
Commonly, and perhaps traditionally, within the context of leases
of immovables for commercial or non-commercial purposes, the Louis-
iana courts have offered relief not in equity but in traditional concepts
of contractual damages as provided in the Louisiana Civil Code pro-
visions governing obligations." In a number of cases involving com-
36. La. Civ. Code art. 2692(1). The full text of article 2692 is quoted in infra note
52.
37. See Bullis, Bench and Bar-Recent Louisiana Jurisprudence Regarding Land-
owners' Rights in a Proven Oil or Gas Field, 14 Tul. L. Rev. 423, 425 n.5 (1940); Nabors,
The Louisiana Mineral Servitude and Royalty Doctrines: A Report to the Mineral Law
Committee of the Louisiana State Law Institute, 26 Tul. L. Rev. 23, 45 n.390 (1951);
Tracey, The Effects of Top Leasing in the Louisiana Law of Oil & Gas, 43 La. L. Rev.
1189, 1196 n.27 (1983). See also Baker v. Potter, 223 La. 274, 284, 65 So. 2d 598, 601,
(La. 1953).
38. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1994-2002. Those articles state:
Art. 1994. Obligor liable for failure to perform
An obligor is liable for the damages caused by his failure to perform a
conventional obligation.
A failure to perform results from nonperformance, defective performance, or
delay in performance.
Art. 1995. Measure of damages
Damages are measured by the loss sustained by the obligee and the profit of
which he has been deprived.
Art. 1996. Obligor in good faith
An obligor in good faith is liable only for the damages that were foreseeable
at the time the contract was made.
Art. 1997. Obligor in bad faith
An obligor in bad faith is liable for all the damages, foreseeable or not, that
are a direct consequence of his failure to perform.
Art. 1998. Damages for nonpecuniary loss
Damages for nonpecuniary loss may be recovered when the contract, because
of its nature, is intended to gratify a nonpecuniary interest and, because of the
circumstances surrounding the formation or the nonperformance of the contract,
1991] 1129
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mercial leases, an interruption of the lessee's peaceable possession39 by
the lessor has left the lessee with the burden of proving actual damages.
0
The courts have adhered to this requirement regardless of the lessor's
methods or inferences as to his motives. 4' Lessees have been relegated
to these damage standards for their remedy even where the lessor's
interference with the lessee's possession was an effort to "get rid of
[the lessee] as his tenant." The court held in such an instance that even
though the lessor failed in his effort to rid himself of the lessee, "it
is not shown that, by the attempt, the [lessee] was injured. '42
Under a perfunctory count alone, the instances where the Louisiana
courts have merely awarded provable damages to compensate the lessee
the obligor knew, or should have known, that his failure to perform would
cause that kind of loss.
Regardless of the nature of the contract, these damages may be recovered
also when the obligor intended, through his failure, to aggrieve the feelings of
the obligee.
Art. 1999. Assessment of damages left to the court
When damages are insusceptible of precise measurement, much discretion shall
be left to the court for the reasonable assessment of these damages.
Art. 2000. Damages for delay measured by interest; no need of proof; attorney
fees
When the object of the performance is a sum of money, damages for delay
in performance are measured by the interest on that sum from the time it is
due, at the rate agreed by the parties or, in the absence of agreement, at the
rate of legal interest as fixed by Article 2924. The obligee may recover these
damages without having to prove any loss, and whatever loss he may have
suffered he can recover no more. If the parties, by written contract, have
expressly agreed that the obligor shall also be liable for the obligee's attorney
fees in a fixed or determinable amount, the obligee is entitled to that amount
as well.
Art. 2001. Interest on interest
Interest on accrued interest may be recovered as damages only when it is
added to the principal by a new agreement of the parties made after the interest
has accrued.
Art. 2002. Reasonable efforts to mitigate damages
An obligee must make reasonable efforts to mitigate the damage caused by
the obligor's failure to perform. When an obligee fails to make these efforts,
the obligor may demand that the damages be accordingly reduced.
La. Civ. Code arts. 1994-2002. Compare Pacific Express Co. v. Haven, 41 La. Ann. 811
(1889) (commercial application) with Grace v. Haas, 20 La. Ann. 73 (1868) (non-commercial
application).
39. See La. Civ. Code art. 2692(3). The full text of Article 2692 is quoted in infra
note 52.
40. See, e.g., Dehan v. Youree, 161 La. 806, 109 So 498 (La. 1926); Bennett v.
Weinberger, 160 La. 1001, 107 So 780 (La. 1926); Pierre Mengelle & Co. v. Abadie, 48
La. Ann. 669, 19 So. 670 (1896); Creole Corp. v. McMillan, 379 So. 2d 805 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1980).
41. See, e.g., Knox v. Booth, 19 La. Ann. 109 (1867); Moity v. Castille, 469 So.
2d 503 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985); Fo-Coin Co. v. Drury, 349 So. 2d 382 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1977).
42. 19 La. Ann. at 110 (emphasis added).
1130 [Vol. 51
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suffering interference by the lessor far outnumbers the few cases where
equitable relief has been used to remedy the lessee's plight. In fact, in
instances that perhaps warranted drastic relief for the lessee, the courts
have failed to recognize any need for a resort to equity.
43
B. Common Law Jurisprudence
The common law jurisdictions are likewise devoid of instances of
remedies such as the one employed in McCrary." The common law
jurisdictions do, for the most part, recognize a covenant of peaceable
or quiet enjoyment for the benefit of the lessee guaranteed by the lessor.45
Their relief, however, follows the path of the majority of Louisiana
cases: actual damages." Although some common law jurisdictions employ
equity in the form of injunctive relief where a lessor's interference
amounts to trespass, 47 the general consensus is to award damages. 48 In
fact, the exceptional approach used by the Louisiana Supreme Court in
Williams v. James" was specifically and summarily rejected by one
common law jurisdiction. In Peachtree on Peachtree Investors v. Reed
Drug Co.,1O the Georgia Supreme Court, rejecting the equitable remedy
43. See Baldo v. Thibodeaux 336 So. 2d 1075 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976). See also
Bennett v. Weinberger, 160 La. 1001, 1007, 107 So. 780, 782 (La. 1926) ("[Tlhe court
would [not] be authorized to make an arbitrary assessment of damages. We therefore
find no justification for increasing the amount allowed by the judgment below.").
44. Research performed in that context reveals no cases in the United States, outside
of Louisiana, employing an equitable extension of a lease term to effect a remedy for a
lessee whose peaceful possession has been disturbed.
45. See generally 2 H. Tiffany, Treatise on the Law of Landlord and Tenant §
353(b), 2124-30 (1912) [hereinafter Tiffany]; 2 R. Powell & P. Rohan, Powell on Real
Property, 232[l] (1988) [hereinafter Powell]; Restatement (Second) of Property, § 6.1
(1977). See also Cal. Comm. Code § 10211 (West 1990); Md. Real Prop. Code § 8-204
(1988); Mass. Gen. L. Ch. 186 § 14 (1981); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 43-32-6 (1983);
W. Va. Code § 36-4-14 (1985). Compare La. Civ. Code art. 2692.
46. Powell, supra note 45, at 1 232[3] and 231[lb (Additionally, the lessee may be
entitled to a termination of the lease depending on the severity of the interference with
his possession); Tiffany, supra note 45, at Vol. 1, § 85, 547-52. Restatement (Second) of
Property § 6.1, supra note 45, outlines the damage remedies and equitable remedies to
a landlord's interference. Among those remedies are the abatement of rent. (Compare
La. Civ. Code art. 2700.) Absent from those equitable remedies is any indication that
substantive terms of the lease may be altered, aside from the amount of the rent. In
essence, abatement of the rent, since rent is normally paid in money, is damages.
47. See, e.g., Baltimore Butchers Abattoir & Live Stock Co. v. Union Rendering
Co., 179 Md. 117, 17 A. 2d 130 (Md. App. 1941); Winchester v. O'Brien, 266 Mass.
33, 164 N.E. 807 (Mass. 1929).
48. See supra note 46 and authorities cited therein. For an application, see City of
New York v. Pike Realty Corp., 247 N.Y. 245, 160 N.E. 359 (N.Y. 1928).
49. 188 La. 884, 178 So. 384 (La. 1938). See supra text accompanying notes 32-37
for the discussion of Williams.
50. 251 Ga. 692, 308 S.E.2d 825 (Ga. 1983).
1991]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
used in Williams, turned to sections 364 and 366 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, stating that such an award of specific performance
should "be refused-if it would cause unreasonable hardship or loss to
the party in breach ... [and] if the enforcement and supervision of
such a decree places too great a burden on the court."'"
IV. LOUISIANA CODE PROVISIONS AND THEIR SOURCE
In Louisiana, the obligations of a lessor, created by the contract
of lease, are governed in part by Louisiana Civil Code article 2692.52
This article has remained, with minor grammatical change, identical to
its original codification in Louisiana in 1808.53 It is also virtually identical
to article 1719 of the Code Napoleon of 1804,54 making analysis of the
doctrine concerning that provision relevant to the interpretation of Louis-
iana Civil Code article 2692. In essence, Article 2692 forms the source
of the lessor's obligation to keep the lessee in peaceable possession which
was breached by the lessor in McCrary and under which a right to
relief flowed to the lessee.5 Because the jurisprudence interpreting the
obligation created by Article 2692 in the surface lease contract does not
reveal that damages which flow from a failure in performance are to
be equitable in nature,56 an analysis of the sources is warranted.
The redactors of Article 2692 in its original form acknowledge
Pothier as a source for the provisions codified by it.57 An examination
of Pothier's materials concerning the contract of lease shows that the
lessee has an action for "dommages et int&rets" (damages-interests) in
the case of a breach by the lessor of the obligation formed by this
51. Id. at 697, 308 S.E.2d at 829.
52. La. Civ. Code art. 2692 states:
The lessor is bound from the very nature of the contract, and without any
clause to that effect:
1. To deliver the thing leased to the lessee.
2. To maintain the thing in a condition such as to serve for the use
for which it is hired. ,i
3. To cause the lessee to be in peaceable possession of the thing during
the continuance of the lease.
Note that Williams v. James, 188 La. 884, 178 So. 384 (La. 1938), involved a breach
of paragraph (1), Davis v. McConnell, 146 So. 54 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1933), involved a
breach of paragraph (2), and the subject case, paragraph (3).
53. La. Civ. Code. art. 2692 (1952), "history and text of former codes."
54. Id.
55. Specifically, La. Civ. Code art. 2692(3).
56. See supra text accompanying notes 38-43.
57. L. Moreau-Lislet, Digest of the Civil Laws now in force in the Territory of
Orleans (1808) (Reprint 1968), Bk. 3, Ti. 8, Ch. 2, Sect. II, Art. 17. The manuscript
also cites Las Siete Partidas as a source of these provisions. The relevant provision,
establishing lessor's obligations, is in line with the French sources. Las Siete Partidas,
Part V, Tit. VIII, Law XXI (Scott trans. 1931).
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article."8 In his discussion of actions arising from the lessor's breach of
his obligation59 to provide peaceable possession, Pothier states that the
damages contemplated "follow the general principles . .. [which] result
from the failure to perform obligations, consisting of the diminution
which the failure ...caused the lessee, and the gain or profit of which
he was [deprived]. ' )60 This concept of damages is the same as that
embodied by the Louisiana Civil Code under the title Conventional
Obligations or Contracts. 6' The principle of money damages for a lessor's
breach has been followed in relevant doctrine through the years and
mention is not made of equitable remedies of the nature employed in
McCrary.62 Additionally, no mention is made of an ability of the courts
to grant specific performance. It becomes obvious, then, that the doc-
trinaires did not consider specific performance to be available, as they
do consider it the preferred relief where it is available. 63 Therefore, it
58. M. Pothier, Trait6 du Contrat du Louage et Trait6 des Cheptels (1806) 49
[hereinafter Pothier]. Pothier advises that in addition to damages and interests, an action
may be taken by the lessee to have the lessor remove constructions placed upon the lease
premises subsequent to execution of the lease, which interfere with the lessee's peaceable
possession of the lease premises. This is a compelling of specific performance of the
obligation of the lessor to maintain the thing in a condition such as to serve for the use
for which it is hired. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2692(2) and 2698; Article 1723 of the Code
Napoleon, Official Translation of 1804 [C. Civ.] (1824).
59. According to Pothier, the obligation to provide peaceable possession arises from
the particular nature of lease. M. Pothier, supra note 58, at 29 (Pothier claims that these
obligations, i.e. those created in Louisiana Civil Code Article 2692, also arise from "the
good faith which must prevail in all contracts" (emphasis added)). Compare infra text
accompanying notes 98-99.
60. M. Pothier, supra note 58, at 39.
61. Compare supra note 37, text of La. Civ. Code arts. 1994-1997, with M. Bugnet,
Oeuvres de Pothier, Trait6 des Obligations, annot6es et mises en correlation avec le Code
civil et la legislation 76-84 (1861). See also 2 S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 179, at 336, in
7 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1975) ("[Tlhe expected performance that can no longer
take place[] is replaced by a money indemnity: damages (dommages-intkr~ts)") (emphasis
in the original).
62. 1 G. Baudry-Lacantinerie & A. Wahl, Trait6 Th6orique et Pratique de Droit
Civil-Du Contrat de Louage 245-46 (3d ed. 1906); 11 C. Beudant, Cours de Droit Civil
Frangais §§ 491-99, 436-44 (2d ed. 1938); A. Colin et H. Capitant, 2 Cours tlmentaire
de Droit Civil Frangais 593-96 (8th ed. 1935); 17 M. Duranton, Cours de Droit Frangais
§§ 59-63, 42-46 (3d ed. 1834); 25 F. Laurent, Principes de Droit Civil Frangais § 157,
174-75 (1877); 2 M. Planiol, Trait6 tlmentaire de Droit Civil, Vol. 2, Part 2, 60 (La.
St. L. Inst. trans. 1957) [hereinafter Planiol] (referring the issue of damages directly to
application of Article 1184 of the Code Civil); 1 M. Troplong, Le Droit Civil Explique-
De L'tchange et du Louage art. 1724, 360 (3d ed. 1859). Several of these authors also
note that cancellation (r~siliation; see infra text accompanying note 67) of the lease is
available to the lessee, but this is not a prerequisite to the award of damages. Cf. Reed
v. Classified Parking System, 232 So. 2d 103 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 234 So.
2d 194 (1970). Rather, the authorities note that the prerequisite to an award of damages
is the fault of the lessor in causing the breach. Baudry-Lacantinerie, ante.
63. J. Weingarten, Inc. v. Northgate Mall, Inc., 404 So. 2d 896 (La. 1981).
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can be concluded that the use of such a remedy is not founded in the
sources of the Louisiana Civil Code relating to leases.
V. DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIFIC REGULATION OF COMMERCIAL LEASES IN
FRENCH LAW
Unlike Louisiana, France developed specific regulations for com-
mercial leases as part of its commercial law. 64 Under these regulations,
commercial leases are subject to special consideration regarding, for
instance, the renewal of a merchant's lease at expiration of the term. 65
The obvious intent of this legislation, at its inception, was to protect
commercial lessees who have considerable investment in their business
locations and to prevent an unjust enrichment to lessors who could lease
at an increased rate due to the augmented economic value of the location
created by the prior merchant-tenant as a result of his tenancy. 66
Within the contemplation of these regulations and the jurisprudence
interpreting them is the administration of clauses calling for conventional
termination67 upon a resolutory condition. 6 The jurisprudence, however,
has ruled that the invocation of such a clause by a lessor in bad faith
has no effect. 69 An examination of this jurisprudence reveals no use of
equitable remedies for an interruption of possession created by the
lessor's actions; on the contrary, it does not even consider an attempt
by a lessor to seek cancellation to be an interruption of possession. 70
This 'is not to suggest that French courts have not intervened beyond
the scope of dommages et intkr&ts to revise contracts on their own
volition in certain instances. While the civil law is said not to intervene
into the contract, giving it the effect of "law between the parties," '71
64. Code de Commerce [C. Com.J, Appendice, Baux Commerciaux 315-44 (84th ed.
Dalloz, 1989).
65. 1 Encyclopddie Dalloz Juridique, R6petoire de Droit Commercial-Baux Com-
merciaux 22-62 (2d ed. Dalloz, 1972) [hereinafter Encyclop6die Juridique]; M. Planiol,
supra note 62, at 57.
66. See Loi du 30 juin 1926, § 7 (Collection Complete des Lois, Dcrets D'Int~ret
General, Vol. 26, 1926); Trasbot, Legislation-La Propi6td Commerciale, 35 Annales de
Droit Commercial et Industriel Franqais 121, 146 (1926).
67. The term used in the French doctrine and jurisprudence is rksiliation. This is a
term of art in French jurisprudence which literally means a termination but is distin-
guishable from dissolution because all previously rendered performance is given full effect.
Thus in the context of leases, all previous rental payments would not have to be returned.
The lease merely stops having any effects from the moment of resiliation forward.
68. Encyclop6die Juridique, supra note 65, at 18. ("The lease is susceptible of being
terminated in its own right by the exercise of a resolutory clause included in the con-
tract. . . .").
69. Id. at 19.
70. Decision Cour de Cassation [Cass. Civ. Com.] 30 janv. 1981, Inf. Rap. 393.
71. See La. Civ. Code art. 1983.
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French courts have revised contracts to some limited extent where there
has been error, fraud, duress, failure of cause, or even upon non-
performance.7 One notable instance involved a lessee's suit for recovery
upon the lessor's failure to provide possession of a valuable part of the
lease object.7 3 The revision sustained in that case by the Cour de cassation
was a reduction of the rent to reflect the decreased value of the lease
object. 74 The French court did not extend the duration of the lease.
This "revision" is, in effect, only one in words because a reduction in
rent in favor of the lessee is equivalent to a payment of damages by
the lessor. 75
VI. COMPARING EQUITY WITH tQUITA
The McCrary court asserted that it was employing an equitable
remedy. It did not, however, clarify the source of the remedy. Thus,
it is unclear from the case report whether this was the operation of
equity or 6quit6.
Louisiana Civil Code article 4 states: "When no rule for a particular
situation can be derived from legislation or custom, the court is bound
to proceed according to equity. To decide equitably, resort is made to
justice, reason, and prevailing usages. ' 7 6 "Equity" in article 4 is a
translation of the French "6quit6. '77 Its principles are expounded in the
72. Legrand, Judicial Revision of Contracts in French Law: A Case-Study, 62 Tul.
L. Rev, 962 (1988) [hereinafter Legrand].
73. Judgment of Mar. 5, 1894, Cass. Ch. Civ., 1894 D.P.I. 509.
74. Legrand, supra note 72, at 1034. Compare text accompanying supra note 46.
75. This approach is also analogous to the provisions enumerated by La. Civ. Code
art. 2700:
If, during the continuance of the lease, the thing leased should be in want of
repairs, and if those repairs can not be postponed until the expiration of the
lease, the tenant must suffer such repairs to be made, whatever be the incon-
venience he undergoes thereby, and though he be deprived either totally or in
part of the use of the thing leased to him during the making of the repairs.
But in case such repairs should continue for a longer time than one month,
the price of the rent shall be lessened in proportion to the time during which
the repairs have continued, and to the parts of the tenement for the use of
which the lessee has thereby been deprived.
And the whole of the rent shall be remitted, if the repairs have been of such
nature as to oblige the tenant to leave the house or the room and to take
another house, while that which he had leased was repairing.
(Emphasis added); and also to La. Civ. Code art. 2701:
If, in the lease of a predial estate, the premises have been stated to be of a
greater extent than they in reality are, the lessee may claim an abatement of
the rent, in the cases and subject to the provisions prescribed in the title: Of
Sale.
(Emphasis in original).
76. La. Civ. Code art. 4.
77. La. Civ. Code art. 21 (1870) (compiled ed. 1972).
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second sentence of that article: resort to justice; reason, and prevailing
usages."8 The provision limits the use of 6quit6 to situations where there
is no express law. When a lessor breaches his obligation to give peaceable
possession, the lessee is given an express remedy.79 As a result, courts
cannot fashion remedies under the auspices of law. As the supreme
court has stated, "[c]onsiderations of equity [6quitf] are not admissible
for the determination of contractual rights clearly expressed; resort may
be had to natural law and reason only where positive law is silent." 0
tquit is a "juridical method," not a "historical" remedy. s
Equity, on the other hand, was a development of the common law,
not to provide for the "unprovided for" case, but to avoid the "defects
of justice" when an aggrieved party was relegated to an inadequate
remedy due to the rigidity of the common law and the doctrine of stare
decisis.Y But equity is not the fashioning of remedies limited only by
the discretion of the court; it is still precedential in nature.83 As an
English court once commented:
[T]he discretion of the Court must be exercised according to
fixed and settled rules; you cannot exercise a discretion by merely
considering what, as between the parties, would be fair to be
done; what one person may consider fair, another person may
consider very unfair; you must have some settled rule and prin-
ciple upon which to determine how that discretion is to be
exercised. 4
Whether exercised by discretion or by rule, equity will not intervene
where damages would be an adequate remedy."5 In similar considerations
78. La. Acts 1987, No. 124 enacted article 4. It substituted the term "justice" for
the term "natural law". Comment (b) to that article indicates that the term "natural
law" was replaced since it had no definition in Louisiana law. It is interesting to note
that the term "justice" likewise has no definition in Louisiana law.
79. La. Civ. Code art. 2668 (stipulating that, in addition to the lease provisions,
leases are governed by the title Of Conventional Obligations). See infra text accompanying
notes 97-100.
80. Baker v. Potter, 223 La. 274, 280, 65 So. 2d 598, 600 (1953). It is interesting
to note that the court refuses the defendant's equity argument concerning his attempts
to pay delay rentals. Upon rehearing, the court, having decided earlier that the defendant's
attempt to pay delay rentals had continued the mineral lease in effect by its own terms,
the court suspended and extended the lease term for the defendant, a remedy resorted
to even where positive law is not silent.
81. Franklin, Equity in Louisiana: The Role of Article 21, 9 Tul. L. Rev. 485, 497
(1935).
82. E. Fry, Specific Performance of Contracts 22-23 (6th ed. 1921) [hereinafter Fry];
G. Keeton and L. Sheridan, Equity 1-2 (3d ed. 1987) [hereinafter Keeton].
83. Keeton, supra note 82, at 6-7; Haywood v. Cope, 25 Beav. 138, 53 Eng. Rep.
589 (1858).
84. 25 Beav. at 151, 53 Eng. Rep. at 594.
85. Keeton, supra note 82, at 456-57.
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to the instant case, where specific performance of the execution of a
formal lease was demanded, and the term of the lease had since expired,
English courts of equity have refused the decree 6
Louisiana law does not provide for equity."7 However, this is not
to say that it has not crept into Louisiana jurisprudence.88 But the
argument would be moot, as neither "equity" nor "6quit6" would
seemingly provide for the use of the remedy employed in McCrary.
VII. SuMMARY AND ANALYSIS
In this examination, the lack of jurisprudential guidance is evident.
Louisiana courts have very rarely formed remedies in equity for lessees
whose peaceable possession was breached. Common law jurisdictions
follow what the majority of Louisiana cases give as the remedy: actual
damages. The French doctrinal materials interpreting this obligation all
adhere to "dommages et int6rets" as being the appropriate relief to an
interruption of possesion generally. Even where the French have devel-
oped specific rules for the administration of commercial leases, their
interpretation of analogous situations still results in the award of proven
damages. Even where the lessor in bad faith has sought judicial can-
cellation (r6siliation) of a commercial lease, the French courts do not
find the default notice to be a disturbance of peaceable possession.
Nevertheless, the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal found
"no abuse of discretion by the trial court in suspending the lease
[term]."89 It relied upon the perceived existence of some form of equity
jurisdiction to sustain this remedy. But equity [6quit6] is limited by
Louisiana Civil Code article 4. Under the Louisiana Civil Code, rules
pertaining to leases and the obligations created by that nominate contract
are clearly exposited in legislation. There is no room for equity [6quitf]
where the law is clear. Equity in the common law sense, as has been
seen, would also not provide this remedy. While the courts have noted
that there are instances where equity avoids injustice, 90 its application
86. See Nesbitt v. Meyer, I Sw. 223, 36 Eng. Rep. 366 (1818), and discussion contained
in Fry, supra note 82, at 433. For a more complete analysis of the different meanings
of "equity," see 2 J. Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence 594-98 (3d ed. 1869).
87. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1, 3. See also Bonneau v. Blalock, 484 So. 2d 275, 276
(La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 488 So. 2d 700-01 (1986) ("The concept of equity as
provided in Article 21 [1870] is not interchangeable with the concept of equity in common
law jurisdictions.").
88. See generally Tate, The Role of the Judge in Mixed Jurisdictions: The Louisiana
Experience 23-37, and Barham, A Renaissance of the Civilian Tradition in Louisiana 38-
68, both reprinted in J. Dainow, The Role of Judicial Decisions and Doctrine in Civil
Law and Mixed Jurisdictions (1974).
89. 560 So. 2d at 50.
90. Housing Auth. v. Burks, 486 So. 2d 1068 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986); Housing
Auth. of St. John v. Shepherd, 447 So. 2d 1232 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984).
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to commercial situations where the parties are of equal sophistication
is not warranted. 9'
Commercial parties require clear direction from the law under which
they guide their business actions. Obviously the plaintiffs in McCrary
did not contemplate that judicial resolution of their dispute with the
lessee would result in almost 9 years of lost rentals. Commercial parties
conduct their relations with the law of the state supplementing their
contractual terms. The law of Louisiana concerning contractual relations
is embodied in the code and plaintiffs had every reason to believe that
it would regulate any circumstance arising from that relationship.
Additionally, commercial parties should not be subject to equity
where its use leads to an unreasonable loss or hardship.9 2 A lessor, in
effect, sells the right of enjoyment to a thing, for a price, and with a
term for that enjoyment.93 The term is commonly expressed in months
or years. But not any month or year is contemplated; rather, a specific
starting date is employed to determine when the term will commence
running. Therefore, the interpretation in a business context is not that
a lessor allows enjoyment for a period of time; it is enjoyment over
specified time. For instance, if A leases to B Arpent Noir for five years
commencing January 1, 1990, B is entitled to peaceable enjoyment of
Arpent Noir every day from January 1, 1990 until December 31, 1994.
B is not entitled to make up his five year term by possession in 1990,
1992, 1994, 1996, and 1998. Nor is B entitled to start his five year term
at any arbitrary time which would extend his term past December 31,
1994.94
So, effectively, a lease is similar to a sale of the enjoyment of a
thing as owner at a particular time. Suppose A leases to B an object
for a term of one day, that day to be January 1, 1990. On January
2, 1990, A can never again lease that object on January 1, 1990. In
this way, the lease is like a sale of a perishable item. Commercial lessors,
therefore, deal in perishable goods: the right of enjoyment of an asset
on a particular day or series of days. Within a given time frame, there
are only a limited number of "days of enjoyment" which can be sold.
Specific performance is likewise not available where the object of per-
formance has perished.95
91. See supra text accompanying note 13.
92. See supra text accompanying note 51.
93. La. Civ. Code arts. 2670, 2674.
94. Note the language of La. Civ. Code art. 2674:
To let out a thing is a contract by which one of the parties binds himself
to grant to the other the enjoyment of a thing during a certain time, for a
certain stipulated price which the other binds himself to pay him.
(emphasis added).
95. La. Civ. Code art. 1986.
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When the court uses equity to suspend or extend the lease term, it
is effectively giving the lessee something not bargained for. The court
deprives the lessor of an asset which can never be regained. The result
in McCrary did not eliminate, as the court suggested that it did, the
unjust enrichment of the lessees. Lessors will collect fifty years of rent
for fifty-nine years of occupancy. This is not that for which they
bargained.
Another result of using equity in this situation is the quandary
created when the situation is reversed. If a lessor seeks to evict a lessee
who unjustifiably occupies the lease premises after his term has expired,
the lessor can only be awarded additional rentals commensurate with
the time the lessee occupied the premises. The court cannot use equity
to return the time of occupancy to the lessor; it no longer exists. It
does not seem equitable to use remedies for one party, regardless of
good faith or bad faith, when the remedy cannot be applied in the
reverse scenario. While symmetry of relief is not necessary, it is nev-
ertheless appealing and a valid consideration in the use of equity.
Further, the use of this equitable remedy creates a chilling effect
upon commercial lessors who seek to use the court to dissolve their
leases. There is an underlying policy to keep goods in commerce. The
effect of the decision in McCrary, however, may serve to leave some
goods out of their fullest commercial use. The lessor whose lessee is
not using the commercial property in accordance with the intent of the
lease would leave the property in this limited use rather than risk the
chance that his interpretation of the lease is incorrect and suffer a
judicial suspension of the lease term. The lessor stands to lose his
"perishable" commodity, time.
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS
In the future the courts should rein in the formulation and use of
equitable remedies in commercial contexts. Equity is not "omnipotent
nor omniscient." ' The mandate of article 4 of the Louisiana Civil Code
is clear: do not proceed to equity when there is a rule to be derived
from legislation.
The course of action which should be taken by the courts is simple.
The relief given should be in accordance with the Civil Code. In instances
where there is impracticability of specific performance, such as that in
McCrary, resort is to damages. 97
Damages in the case where a lessor has interfered with the peaceable
possession of the lessee should be determined under the guidelines of
Louisiana Civil Code articles 1994-2002.98 In the case where a lessor
96. Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S. 2d 653, 679 (1941).
97. La. Civ Code art. 1986.
98. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1994-2002. For the text of these articles see supra note
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seeks cancellation, and cancellation is denied, determination of the les-
sor's "good faith" or his "bad faith" is the key to assessment of the
lessee's damages. 9 This leaves lessors who honestly believe they are
entitled to cancellation the opportunity to seek judicial relief and punishes
those lessors who unjustifiably interfere with the lessee's possession in
that manner. Damages in either scenario are limited to those which can
be proved. If it is difficult to assess a monetary value, resort can be
made to Article 1999.100 These provisions can be used effectively to
recompense the lessee and-do not create any ambiguity for commercial
parties. Commercial parties operating under leases will have clear effects
in mind for their actions and these effects will govern their business
judgments.
IX. CONCLUSION
The court in McCrary showed no basis for its formulation of a
remedy other than equity. While there was precedent for this judicial
action in the Louisiana jurisprudence, the jurisprudence is obscure and
the court failed to cite it. The codal provisions regulating leases do not
warrant the use of such a remedy and the source doctrine is devoid of
any reference to this use of equity. Our counterparts in France have
consistently relied on the principle of dommages et intkrets to compensate
an aggrieved lessee. Even where the French law has developed in the
area of commercial leases, it still does not contemplate the relief used
in McCrary.
Given the temporal element inherent in leasing, equitable remedies
which extend or suspend a lease term are a deprivation of commodities
not contemplated in the original lease. These remedies can yield no
commensurate effect when the scenario is reversed and will discourage
lessors in good faith from exercising their right to cancellation. They
should not be employed.
There is no specific performance available, the object of performance
having "perished." An aggrieved lessee must take his solace in actual
monetary damages. If a lessee has been deprived of his opportunity to
develop commercial real estate, then the court should employ its dis-
cretion to estimate the value of such a loss, but only if that value is
99. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1996, 1997; M. Planiol, supra note 62, at 25 (Where
the lessor is held to pay damages, application should be made of art. 1150 [La. Civ.
Code art. 1996], when he is in good faith, and make him responsible for the damages
which he foresaw or could have foreseen at the time of the contract.).
100. See text of Article 1999 at supra note 38. For an application of La. Civ. Code
art. 1999, see Nipper v. Baton Rouge Railcar Services, 526 So. 2d 824, 827 (La. App.
1st Cir.), writ denied, 530 So. 2d 84, 87 (1988) ("[When plaintiff has a right of recovery,
but the damages cannot be ascertained with certainty, courts have discretion to assess
damages based upon all the pertinent facts and circumstances.").
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insusceptible of ascertainment. When a lessor seeks cancellation and is
in bad faith in doing so, then the courts may open up the doors of
"foreseeability" and award the aggrieved lessee accordingly.
Geoffrey J. Orr

